2: Fortes E-5 (1934-1937) 1945
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pensation sink into the background, the sanctions inherent in the native social structure prevail, and the traditional ties of politico-ritual collaboration come into force. But when the new interests brought into being by the influence of the British Administration come to the fore, the traditional social ties and the sanctions associated with them no longer prevail. For among the Tallensi, as among ourselves, such ties and sanctions do not function at all times and in all circumstances. They work in the context of the scheme of social relationships of which they form a part and not in other contexts. These new interests mobilize the existing corporate units of Tale society. Thus they tend to deepen some of the cleavages that exist, and to weaken the countervailing ties, between lineages and clans. It is noteworthy that rivalry for the rewards of political power under the British Administration is most acute between clans that have close ties in the native social system. As was the case with war in former days, clans and maximal lineages that are widely separated from one another, either locally or in terms of their fields of social relations, cannot come into conflict or competition with one another. Thus political rivalry between the Chief of Tongo and his 'younger brother' the Chief of Yamələg is severe and has led to estrangement between these two branches of Mosuor biis. But there is no political rivalry between the Chief of Tongo and the Chief of Datɔk. Competition for politico-ritual office within clans is fiercer than it was in the past and less scrupulous, though it still follows the lines of cleavage in the lineage structure.

At the same time some chiefs have used their new powers to weld their clans into closer unity on the political plane than existed in the old days. This has happened at Tongo and at Sie. But it has not been to the benefit of the social balance in the greater society. By strengthening the autocratic ambitions of these chiefs, the closer unity of their clans has tended to aggravate the antagonisms between clans.

B. *Pecuniary Competition among the Hill Talis*

A new factor of disequilibrium that has had a very disturbing influence among the Hill Talis is pecuniary competition which has become associated with certain traditional institutions. Many families nowadays obtain driblets of money through members of the family working abroad, or by petty trade. But the pecuniary competition we are referring to concerns money on a scale unprecedented in Tale history; and its disruptive influence is due to its association with a traffic in ritual benefits comparable to that of the notorious Southern Nigerian oracles.

The centre of this traffic is the Tong Hills, and its disruptive influence has been greatest among the Hill Talis, where it has brought violent competition into the sphere of the common ritual interests and values which form the bulwark of their cohesion. The integration of the Hill Talis in the native social structure depends, as we have seen, on a meticulous balance of local, clanship, and ritual ties and cleavages focused in the politico-ritual offices vested in the heads of maximal lineages. So nicely calculated is the distribution of these politico-ritual functions amongst the various maximal lineages that none can claim

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788 set up a shrine affiliated to Tɔŋna'ab at their own homes, and these
782 shrines are used by them (*vide* Field, op. cit.) in their own ritual practice
425 to cure witchcraft and dissipate other forms of magical misfortune or misdeeds.

431 This traffic is extremely profitable to the Hill Talis concerned in it.
788 The pilgrims bring gifts in money and kind beside which the traditional
439 gifts of Mamprusi or Bulisi client villages pale into insignificance. Those
434 who have received benefits bring gifts. The medicine men who own affiliated shrines pay heavily for the privilege and bring periodical gifts in gratitude for benefits received. These vary from a pound or two to £10, £20, and in at least one case, for the authenticity of which I have good evidence, £100. In addition the pilgrims pay generously for their board and lodging and for animals which they offer in sacrifice at the *Bɔyar*.

556 From the beginning this traffic was monopolized by one maximal
439 lineage of Tɛnzugu, Gɔlibdaan yidɛm of Bunkiuk. The head of this
471 lineage, the Gɔlibdaana, a shrewd and resolute man of unbounded ambition, was, until the recent political reorganization of the country, recognized by Government as the headman of the Hill clans. He used his political authority to keep the pilgrim traffic with the south in his own hands, allowing only a minor share of the profits to go to his fellow ritual functionaries of the *Bɔyar* (Wannii) to which his lineage belongs. With the aid of the young men of his lineage and young men of other Tɛnzugu clans attracted to him by the lure of gain he has built up a complex organization for keeping contact with Ashanti and Colony pilgrims and clients and for stimulating the flow of pilgrims. By Tale standards he is a Croesus, but it would be hopeless for an outsider to attempt to estimate his wealth. It is enough to see his huge and well-kept homestead, his [595] eighty wives, the sumptuous clothes he affects, the extravagance of his gifts to friends and adherents, to realize that he must derive an income of several hundred pounds a year entirely from this pilgrim traffic.

Though he is himself the principal beneficiary of this monopoly, all the members of his maximal lineage, except one segment, co-operate in running it and benefit from it. His closest partners are some of his own half-brothers and cousins, and their share of the profits is enough to make them considerably more wealthy than the average native. Two or three henchmen belonging to other Tɛnzugu clans and the other ritual functionaries of the *Bɔyar* whose presence is essential for the performance of the rites of accepting the pilgrims get about the same 'rake-off' as his near agnates. On a rough estimate I should say that the Gɔlibdaana keeps about half the profits and divides the other half among the other [595] men interested in the business. This enables these others—his close agnates, his henchmen, and the other ritual functionaries of the *Bɔyar*—to have from five to nine wives each, where the ordinary native of similar age and status would have at most two or three wives; and the number of wives a man has is a good indication of his income in terms of food-supply and cash. The economic system of the Tallensi provides no outlets for this wealth in new economic enterprise. What cannot be invested in wives, live-stock, and clothes, or consumed in the form of